Let us recapitulate here. A unified learning process is presented here, the principles of which are consistently applied through three distinct periods; the acquisition of knowledge, the analytical examination of it and a third stage where knowledge might be called wisdom. The last stage has been referred to as a synthetic function of memory, the stage where the significance of knowledge is revealed; an understanding of the whole, the capacity for understanding details within the whole, a generative stage of knowledge (...) similar to language, a revelatory knowledge, metaphysical, samadhi, heightened perception, vision.Throughout these stages the passive aspect of mind is emphasized as a practical learning technique in acquisition, analysis and understanding. That is exploited at a physical level in asanas, in the three thinking processes and in metaphysical realization. Quotes illustrate this aspect as a basic principle of the mind, of metaphysics and of the acquisition of knowledge at different levels. This principle is used to explain aesthetic experience and ultimate realization. The reason for its predominance and the metaphysical presuppositions that perhaps cleared the way for systematic training in this technique have been given. It is of interest to note that systematic training in this technique still occurs in India today.This process is a peculiar union of memory and perceptive capacities. Essentially, the haphazard memory fund is eliminated for a form of creative and exact thinking or knowledge. This unification of memory and perception has given this paper its name. This learning process has as its aim not the accumulation of knowledge but guidance in correct thinking. It stems from the realization that our perception is conditioned by our memory, that is, the limitations of our knowledge. That conditioning, like ajñāna, prevents us from knowing what we do not know. The transformation involved requires an instantaneous understanding which, while remaining aware of the objects of perception and the process of perception, really centres in the perceiver himself.An old Lapp song brings out the paradox in memory: And its we too, Our memory, memory of ourselves... Disappears, disappears... We remember and we've forgotten. We are both old.The Chandogya states: smaramupāssva Ch. U 7.13.1, devoted yourself to memory. (shrink)

A theory of syllogistic reasoning is proposed, derived from the medieval doctrine of 'distribution of terms'. This doctrine may or may not furnish an adequate ground for the logic of the syllogism but does appear to illuminate the psychological processes involved. Syllogistic thinking is shown to have its origins in the approach and avoidance behaviour of pre-verbal organisms and, in verbal (human) organisms, to bridge the gap between the intuitive grasp shown by most of us of the validity of simple (...) logical arguments and the failure of intuition in more complex arguments that require resort to calculation. Some difficulties are considered affecting the use of syllogisms as experimental material. These include failure on the part of the investigator to take account of the fact that a syllogism is always part of a continuing argument in which the topic of the argument is known to all parties and the possibility that subjects may find ways of appearing to solve syllogisms without actually doing so. (shrink)

This second edition has been revised to provide additional coherence to the themes examined and introduces sections on topical issues, for example the chapter on Utilitarianism now includes a discussion on law and economics.

The essay replies to comments by Finnis, Gardner and Endicott, on my book, Law as a Moral Idea. It is questioned whether Finnis is right to suggest that governance by law is a requirement of justice. It is suggested that Hart's positivism may have rested upon an unduly private conception of morality. Gardner's suggestion that Law as a Moral Idea falsely manufactures disagreement with Hart is rejected, principally by pointing out that Gardner focuses upon only one issue, where the book (...) already acknowledges that Hart might conceivably agree, and ignores other issues where the disagreement with Hart seems indisputable. In response to Endicott, it is acknowledged that 'politics' could be understood as a moral idea comparable to the idea of 'law', but denied that this robs either thesis of interest. The nature of doctrinal reasoning and law's justificatory force is then discussed. (shrink)

Revisiting the structure/agency debate, the article puts forward the broad position shared by Giddens’structuration theory and Bhaskar's transformational model. It defends Giddens’concept of structure as‘rules and resources’against charges of idealism, arguing that its strength is its focus on the interface of structure and agency. But both Giddens and Bhaskar emphasise social reproduction as an unintended consequence of social action. Taking issue with postmodern pessimism, the article goes on to consider the conditions of possibility, and requisite forms of knowledgeability, for deliberate (...) social transformation. (shrink)

The authors of this book engage in essay form in a lively debate over the fundamental characteristics of legal and moral rights. They examine whether rights fundamentally protect individuals' interests or whether they instead fundamentally enable individuals to make choices. In the course of this debate the authors address many questions through which they clarify, though not finally resolve, a number of controversial present-day political debates, including those over abortion, euthanasia, and animal rights.

Rachlin's view of self-control is rejected on the grounds that his arguments do not establish the possibility of abstract, external, stimulus patterns and that his experiments, although they show that pigeons and human beings do sometimes choose postponed rather than immediate gratification, do not challenge the commonly held view that internal factors are involved in the former choice.